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During the 2001 UK FMD outbreak, local authorities restricted rural access to try to
prevent further disease spread by people and animals, which had major socio-economic
consequences for rural communities. This study describes the results of qualitative
veterinary risk assessments to assess the likelihood of different recreational activities
causing new outbreaks of foot and mouth disease, as part of contingency planning for
future outbreaks. For most activities, the likelihood of causing new outbreaks of foot and
mouth disease is considered to vary from very low to medium depending on the control
zone (which is based on distance to the nearest infected premises), assuming compliance
with specified mitigation strategies. The likelihood of new outbreaks associated with
hunting, shooting, stalking, and equestrian activities is considered to be greater. There
are areas of significant uncertainty associated with data paucity, particularly regarding
the likelihood of transmission via fomites. This study provides scientific evidence to
underpin refinement of rural access management plans and inform decision-making in
future disease outbreaks.
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INTRODUCTION
Highly contagious diseases of livestock have the potential for significant impact, not only on the
agricultural industry but also the wider economy and on society. Foot and mouth disease virus
(FMDV) is both easily transmissible and able to persist in the environment (1, 2), meaning that
control strategies must aim to prevent transmission via fomites as well as direct contact. Therefore,
foot and mouth disease (FMD) has the potential for substantial societal impact; control strategies
rely not only on mandatory slaughter of infected and in-contact animals and restrictions on
movement and trade of susceptible livestock species (3, 4), but may also require restrictions on
the activities of non-susceptible animals and people, who may transmit the virus mechanically.
During the 2001 UK foot andmouth disease outbreak, UK local authorities took a precautionary
approach to disease control and used blanket bans to close all footpaths, even in uninfected
areas, to try to prevent further disease spread by people and animals. These measures had major
socio-economic consequences for rural communities (5). The tourism sector suffered the greatest
financial impact and is estimated to have lost around £3bn due to the outbreak, due in large part to
the perception that “the countryside was closed” (6, 7). Post-outbreak reports highlighted the need
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for more research on the likely efficacy of biosecurity measures
such as footpath closures, and more transparent risk-based
decision making, particularly regarding rural access (5, 7).
Although the exceptional scale of the 2001 outbreak in UK
undoubtedly exacerbated the issues of rural access (8, 9), the role
of people accessing to the countryside in contributing to onward
transmission of FMD remains an important question that has not
been addressed in Scotland or in other countries that are FMD-
free. In light of this, a suite of veterinary risk assessments (VRAs)
were developed to consider the risk of disease spread associated
with recreational access to the countryside. Here, we describe
the risk assessments and conclusions as well as highlighting key
assumptions and knowledge gaps.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Risk questions were developed for each of 12 countryside
activities: walking, cycling, canoeing, fishing, horse riding,
staging equestrian events, staging a horse racing meet, staging
other events on agricultural land, staging sporting events such as
running competitions or triathlons, drag hunting, stalking deer,
and shooting birds. For each activity, the risk question took the
form “What are the risks of causing new outbreaks of foot and
mouth disease (FMD) by walking, and other similar activities
such as dog walking, and climbing?”
The risk assessments followed a standard approach,
considering (i) hazard identification; (ii) risk pathway; (iii)
legislation, definitions and assumptions; (iv) release and
exposure assessment; (v) consequence assessment; and (vi)
overall likelihood levels and risk management options. A
qualitative approach was chosen over a quantitative approach
after careful consideration of the paucity of data on which to base
a quantitative assessment. Definitions of qualitative likelihood
levels used were derived from those published by the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and adopted by the UK
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
(10, 11) and are presented in Table 1.
A risk pathway was developed for each activity that identified
the steps involved in release of and exposure to FMDV. A
review of the available literature was used to identify all relevant
factors which are likely to influence these steps. A search of the
scientific literature published in peer-reviewed journals was done
using the following search terms: “foot and mouth disease” and:
“wildlife”; “transmission”; “fomites”; “environment”; “survival.”
Important references were also identified in key review papers
(12–15). In addition, previous risk assessments including those
TABLE 1 | Definitions of qualitative likelihood estimate levels.
Likelihood level Description
Negligible So rare that it does not merit consideration
Very low Very rare but cannot be excluded
Low Rare but could occur
Medium Occurs regularly
High Occurs very often
Very High Events occur almost certainly
produced during the 2001 FMD outbreak in UK (9), were
used to inform the exposure and release assessments. On
collation of risk factors, key knowledge gaps or areas of
uncertainty were identified for each step in the pathway.
Likelihood estimates for each step were developed based on the
information available. Likelihood estimates assumed compliance
with standard statutory measures in place during an FMD
outbreak but did not take into account any additional mitigation
measures specific to the activities in question. In reality it is
unlikely that these activities would be permitted in the absence
of additional mitigation measures aimed to reduce the risk
of onward disease transmission. Relevant specific mitigation
measures were identified in consultation with the Animal and
Plant Health Agency (responsible for implementing disease
control) and additional likelihood estimates were provided for
each step assuming these mitigation measures were in place.
Compliance was assumed, although areas of particular concern
for non-compliance were highlighted in the risk assessment. The
consequences of a new outbreak as a result of the risk pathway
were considered, and final risk levels based on a combination
of the likelihood of exposure and release and the severity of
the consequences (11). The VRAs were reviewed by the Scottish
Government and the UK National Experts Group on Foot and
Mouth Disease.
RESULTS
Individual VRAs for each activity can be seen at https://www.
gov.scot/publications/foot-and-mouth-disease-veterinary-risk-
assessments-vras/.
Hazard Identification
The hazard is FMD virus. There are seven serotypes of FMD
virus: O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia 1. Different serotypes
(and different strains within each serotype) have different
characteristics, including variation in host species susceptibility,
length of incubation period, ease of detecting clinical signs and
transmission (16–19). Much research is based on the UK 2001
outbreak, which was caused by serotype O, strain PanAsia (20).
However, future outbreaks may involve other serotypes/strains
and therefore present different epidemiological situations.
The specific risk is that attending, conducting or staging
leisure activities in the countryside during an FMD outbreak may
involve people or associated fomites that have been, or come
into, contact with FMDV and with susceptible livestock, leading
to FMD spread via people or other fomites to cause further
disease outbreaks.
Risk Pathway
Risk pathways were developed for each activity comprising
release and exposure assessments. A summary risk pathway is
shown in Figure 1. Release included persons, animals, vehicles
or other equipment (i) already contaminated on leaving the
home premises; (ii) becoming contaminated on the way to or
from the activity, contaminating roads or the environment;
(iii) coming into contact with susceptible livestock whilst on
the way to or from the activity; (iv) becoming contaminated
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FIGURE 1 | Summary risk pathway. Individual risk pathways were developed for each of 12 activities that require access to the countryside. This summary pathway
illustrates the common steps in the risk pathway from release of FMDV to exposure of susceptible livestock.
via the environment or through contact with infected livestock
during the activity; and (v) contaminating the environment,
moving contamination to new areas, or coming into contact
with susceptible livestock during the activity. Exposure included
susceptible livestock being exposed and ultimately infected,
through coming into contact with contaminated areas, persons,
animals or vehicles, and could occur on return to the home
premises, whilst traveling to or from the activity, or whilst doing
the activity.
Legislation, Definitions, and Assumptions
For the purposes of these VRAs, “access to the countryside”
was defined as recreational activity involving people, vehicles,
equipment, and in some cases, animals. Statutory disease control
requirements limit access and activities on premises where FMD
is suspected or confirmed (3). Control zones are put in place
on suspicion and confirmation of disease to prevent spread of
disease (Figure 2). When suspicion of disease cannot be ruled
out, and diagnostic samples are taken from suspected cases, a
Temporary Control Zone is put in place surrounding the suspect
premises. On disease confirmation, a protection zone (PZ) is set
up around an infected premises, with a minimum radius of 3 km,
or more if necessary to control disease. A surveillance zone (SZ),
with a minimum radius of 10 km from the infected premises, is
set up around the protection zone. A national movement ban
is enforced by introducing a Restricted Zone (RZ). These zones
place restrictions on movements and activities around infected
premises to prevent spread of disease. Later in the outbreak,
restrictions may be relaxed either through reducing the size of
the RZ or through allowing some resumption of normal activities
under license within the RZ, SZ, or PZ. In this VRA, RZ is
used to refer to areas which are within the RZ, but do not also
fall within the PZ or SZ. Some rural activities are specifically
prohibited within particular control zones, for example deer
stalking and drag hunting are not permitted within a PZ. Land
access rights within Scotland are liberal (21) although Scottish
Ministers and local authorities have ability to restrict access for
disease control purposes.
Release and Exposure Assessment
Each step in the risk pathway is discussed below. A summary of
key factors, uncertainties and likelihood levels for each step in
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FIGURE 2 | Zoning during an outbreak: Protection, surveillance and restricted
zones. During an outbreak of FMD, movement control zones are put in place
to help control spread of disease. A protection zone (PZ) is set up around an
infected premises (IP), with a minimum radius of 3 km, or more if necessary to
control disease. A surveillance zone (SZ), with a minimum radius of 10 km from
the infected premises, is set up around the protection zone. A restricted zone
(RZ) is set up outside these areas and extends as far as necessary to prevent
disease spread; it may extend to the whole of Scotland. The number and
extent of these zones changes as the outbreak progresses with new zones
being created around newly identified infected premises. Zones are lifted as
disease is eradicated from premises once disinfection and verification of
disease freedom is met.
the pathway is presented in Table 2. Mitigation measures specific
to each activity are provided in the individual VRA documents
(https://www.gov.scot/publications/foot-and-mouth-disease-
veterinary-risk-assessments-vras/) and key mitigation measures
are summarized in Table 2.
Release Assessment
Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons,
animals, vehicles, or other equipment are contaminated
when leaving home premises
People, fomites or non-susceptible animals present a risk of
FMD transmission if they become contaminated with FMDV.
The likelihood of contamination is greatest on or close to
premises with FMD. Premises with FMD may be detected
(“infected premises”) or as yet undetected. On detected infected
premises, control measures are in place to reduce the likelihood
of FMDV contamination of people, fomites or the environment.
However, contamination remains a possibility. In a PZ there
are known infected premises, in a SZ known infected premises
are located >3 km away and in a RZ known infected premises
are located >10 km away (3). Once a national movement ban
is in place, most transmission occurs by local spread (<3 km
from a premises with FMD) (8, 22, 23), so zone is also a
reasonable indicator of the likelihood of proximity to undetected
infected premises. Early in the outbreak, there is increased risk of
undetected infection in all zones. The risk of undetected premises
with FMD arising from spread over longer distances can be better
quantified by analysis of movement data to identify movements
of animals from areas where FMD has been detected that have
occurred before the implementation of movement restrictions.
The likelihood of detection and transmission is also influenced
by FMD virus strain.
FMD may be present on premises but remain undetected
because (i) animals show no or mild clinical signs; (ii) animals are
incubating infection; (iii) animals show clinical signs but these
are not observed; or (iv) clinical signs are not reported. Although
the peak of transmission occurs shortly after the appearance
of clinical signs (24), infected livestock may excrete FMDV for
several days before the appearance of clinical signs or in the
absence of clinical signs, potentially leading to transmission or
contamination prior to disease detection, particularly in cattle
and pigs (25). Transmission via contaminated surfaces has been
documented before the onset of clinical signs (26). FMD in
sheep can be difficult to detect clinically as not all animals show
clinical signs, and clinical signs are usually mild and short lived
(27). There is therefore a greater risk of undetected infection on
sheep-only premises.
Contamination of people People can carry FMDV on their
clothes, footwear and bodies and pass it to susceptible animals.
Veterinarians and other people were incriminated in spread
leading to 10 of 51 outbreaks during the 1967–1968 outbreak
in UK (28). When people handled pigs infected with FMDV
then immediately handled susceptible sheep and pigs, all animals
became infected (29). Including hand washing and changing
outer wear reduced the risk on onward infection, whilst
showering and changing outer wear prevented it (29, 30). It
should be noted that these infections occurred when contact with
susceptible animals immediately followed handling of pigs with
clear signs of FMD, in laboratory conditions. The likelihood of
similar transmission from handling animals that are incubating
an infection, or that only show mild clinical signs, such as sheep,
is much lower.
There is also evidence that people can carry FMDV in their
nasal cavities, but the likelihood of this leading to infection
in susceptible animals without close and prolonged contact is
negligible. One incident is described where infection was passed
from sick pigs, via people, to a susceptible cow, despite the people
involved fully disinfecting, showering and changing clothes.
The infection was assumed to have passed via the nasal cavity.
However, this required prolonged contact with infected pigs and
deliberate coughing, blowing and sneezing on the muzzles of the
susceptible cattle (31). No FMD virus was detected in nasal swab
samples collected from four investigators 12–84 h after they had
been exposed to the virus, but virus was detected in the nasal
swab from one of four investigators immediately after examining
sick pigs at post-mortem (29). Screening of nasal swabs over
several experiments following handling of various combinations
of infected cattle, sheep, and pigs showed swabs to frequently
test positive for virus by PCR but only occasionally on virus
inoculation, and only one person tested positive the next day
(PCR only), suggesting the likelihood of virus survival in the
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TABLE 2 | Key factors, uncertainties and likelihood levels for each step of the risk pathway.
Evidence for each step of risk pathway Key knowledge gaps and uncertainties Likelihood level without mitigation, key risk factors Likelihood levels with
mitigation, key mitigation
measures
1. Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons, animals, vehicles, or other equipment are contaminated when leaving homepremises
- Proximity to detected infected premises
- Proximity to undetected infectedpremises
- Outbreak stage
- Virus strain
- Livestock speciespresent
- Degree of contact with livestock
- Cleansing anddisinfection
Likelihood of virus survival on different materials and
under different conditions
Quantitative data on the likelihood of transmission
via people, animals, vehicles, and equipment under
differentconditions
PZ—low/medium
SZ—low
RZ and rest of country—very low
Key factors influencingrisk:
- Contact with susceptible livestock increases risk
- Stage of outbreak—early in outbreak uncertainty regarding
undetected infection increasesrisk
PZ—low
SZ—very low
RZ and rest of country—very low
Key mitigationmeasures:
- Cleansing and disinfection on
leaving home premises
- People/vehicles/equipment that
have had contact with IP not to visit
areas with susceptiblelivestock
2. Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons, animals, vehicles, or other equipment become contaminated on route to/from theactivity
- Proximity of route to premises with detected or
undetected FMD
- Length and duration of journey
- Number and nature of stops
- Cleansing anddisinfection
Quantitative data on the likelihood of transmission
via people, animals, vehicles, and equipment under
different conditions
PZ—low/medium
SZ—low
RZ and rest of country—very low
Keyfactors:
- Stage of outbreak—early in outbreak risk is higher
- Stops at premises with or close to susceptible livestock,
multiplestops
PZ—low
SZ—very low
RZ and rest of country—very low
Key mitigationmeasures:
- Cleansing and disinfection of
vehicle on arriving at activity
- Avoiding multiple stops, especially
on equinepremises
3. Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons, animals, vehicles, or other equipment contaminate roads or environment and/or come into contact with susceptible livestock on
route to/from theactivity
- Proximity of route to premises with susceptible
livestock
- Length and duration of journey
- Number and nature ofstops
Quantitative data on the likelihood of transmission
via people, animals, vehicles, and equipment under
different conditions
Low
Keyfactors:
- Stops at premises with or close to susceptiblelivestock
Low
Key mitigationmeasures:
- Cleansing and disinfection on
leaving home premises, and at
any other stops
- Avoiding multiple stops,
especially on equinepremises
4. Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons, animals vehicles, or other equipment become contaminated via environment or contact with infected livestock duringactivity
- Proximity to premises with detected or
undetected FMD
- Presence and density of susceptible livestock at
the location where the activity takes place
- Presence of free ranging dogs
- Level of use of land where activity takes place
- Wildlife in locality
- Meteorologicalconditions
Virus survival in different meteorological and
ecological conditions
PZ—low to medium/high
SZ—low to medium
RZ and rest of country—very low tolow/medium
Keyfactors:
- Stage of outbreak—early in outbreak risk levels higher
- Presence (current or recent) of susceptible livestock in area
activity is taking place
- Proximity, density, and likelihood of contact with susceptible
species
- Disturbance of wildlife
- Number of peopleattending
PZ—low to medium
SZ—low to low/medium
RZ and rest of country—very low to
low
Key mitigationmeasures:
- Preventing public coming into
contact with livestock
- Not parking vehicles where they
can come into contact with
livestock or feces
- Keeping dogs onleads
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TABLE 2 | Continued
Evidence for each step of risk pathway Key knowledge gaps and uncertainties Likelihood level without mitigation, key risk factors Likelihood levels with
mitigation, key mitigation
measures
5. Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons, animals, vehicles, or other equipment contaminate environment or new areas and/or come into contact with
susceptible livestock duringactivity
- Presence and density of susceptible livestock at
the location where the activity takes place
- Number of people, animals, vehicles doingactivity
Quantitative data on the likelihood of transmission
via people, animals, vehicles, and equipment under
different conditions
Low to medium/high
Keyfactors:
- Presence (current or future) of susceptible livestock in area
activity is taking place
- Proximity, density, and likelihood of contact with susceptible
species
- Disturbance of wildlife
- Number of peopleattending
Low
Key mitigationmeasures:
- Preventing public coming into
contact with livestock, e.g.,
encourage public to stick to
footpaths
- Not parking vehicles where they
can come into contact with
livestock
- Keeping dogs onleads
6. Exposure and infection: Susceptible livestock come into contact with contaminated area, persons, animals, orvehicles
- Presence and density of susceptible livestock at
the location where the activity takes place, or on
contaminated routes
- Meteorologicalconditions
Virus survival in different meteorological and
ecological conditions
Very low to medium
Keyfactors:
- Proximity, density, and likelihood of contact of susceptible
livestock
- Presence of susceptible livestock at homepremises
Very low to medium
Key mitigationsmeasures:
- Keep susceptible livestock away
from potentially contaminated areas
(e.g., during and after events held
on agricultural land)
- Cleansing and disinfection on return
to homepremises
7. Exposure and infection: Susceptible livestock exposed to contamination becomeinfected
- Degree of contamination (viral dose)
- Livestockspecies
No specific uncertainties Very low to medium
- Virus load present in contamination
- Species
Very low to medium
Ranges of likelihood levels are provided in column 3 and 4 to illustrate the likelihood levels for different activities The key factors that drive these likelihood levels (often factors that are specific to individual activities) are indicated.
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nasal cavities of personnel 16–22 h after exposure to infected
animals is very small (32). Again, although theoretically possible,
the likelihood of transmission via virus survival in a person’s nasal
cavity due to contact with animals on an undetected premises,
or from animals that are not showing obvious clinical signs, is
very small.
The risk of contamination is greatest if people have had
contact with infected animals, and next greatest if they have had
indirect contact, for example if they have been to premises where
FMD is present (either detected or undetected) but not handled
livestock. The risk is therefore present for anyone who keeps
susceptible livestock or has visited premises with susceptible
livestock (including occupational exposure such as veterinarians)
due to the risk of undetected infection. The likelihood and
amount of contamination varies with species infected, stage of
infection, degree of contact, and any biosecurity measures in
place (29). Although it is known that contaminated people have
played a role in causing new outbreaks (8, 33, 34), there is not
sufficient information to quantify the risk with any certainty.
Contamination of vehicles and equipment. Vehicles and
equipment can act as fomites. Virus can survive in slurry for
up to 9 days at 20◦C, to 14 weeks at 5◦C (35). Virus is also
still viable when dried onto surfaces (36, 37), although the
length of time virus can survive for is less well-quantified.
Contaminated vehicles and equipment have been implicated
in spread in previous outbreaks (8, 28, 33). In UK in 2007,
vehicles contaminated with virus from a laboratory eﬄuent
system were suspected to have moved virus to susceptible cattle
farms (38). As with contamination of people, the greatest risks
of contamination are associated with vehicles that have visited
premises where FMD is present, which is most likely to occur if
they are located close to areas where FMD is known to be present
(i.e., the PZ or SZ). Keeping susceptible livestock or visiting
premises with susceptible livestock also present an increased
risk due to the possibility of undetected infection. Equipment
may be contaminated from use in other areas, for example boats,
bicycles, riding equipment, fishing tackle, guns. However, there
is not sufficient quantitative information to assess the risk with
any certainty.
Contamination of non-susceptible animals such as dogs and horses.
Animals such as dogs and horses are not susceptible to FMD
but may become contaminated and carry the virus mechanically
(12). The likelihood of dogs being contaminated, and the factors
that influence it, are similar as for people and will be greatest if
dogs have had access to infected livestock or livestock products
(34). Equine premises are often close to or associated with
premises where susceptible livestock are kept and may source
products such as straw from livestock-keeping premises, which
can act as fomites. FMDV can survive on bedding and food
stuffs such as hay, straw and bran for over 100 days at 16◦C
[reviewed by (1)] or longer in winter [reviewed by (2)]. Imported
straw was identified as the most likely incursion route for an
outbreak in Japan in 2000 (39). The proximity of the equine
premises to areas where FMD is known to be present, movement
history of horses, presence of susceptible livestock on the same
or adjacent premises, and sources of feed and bedding will
influence the risk that horses are contaminated. Events that bring
together large numbers of horses from multiple areas, such as
events, point to points, shows, competitions, drag hunts, and
race meets present an increased risk of contaminated horses
being present.
Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons,
animals, vehicles, or other equipment become contaminated
on the route to/from the activity
People, vehicles or other equipment could become contaminated
whilst traveling to the location of the activity. The likelihood
depends on the proximity of the route to known infected
premises, the presence of undetected infected premises (which
is influenced by the stage of the outbreak and zone as discussed
above), the length of the journey and the number of stops
or destinations. Any stops made at premises where susceptible
livestock are kept, or are close by, increase the likelihood of
contamination. For example, horseboxes traveling to events
where they stop at multiple yards to collect horses would have a
higher likelihood of becoming contaminated on the route, as well
as increasing the risk of moving FMDV between premises. The
amount of farm traffic and animal movements, and biosecurity
arrangements of local premises will influence the likelihood that
roads are contaminated.
Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons,
animals, vehicles, or other equipment contaminate roads or
environment and/or come into contact with susceptible
livestock on route to/from the activity
Contaminated people, vehicles or other equipment may
contaminate the roads or surrounding areas whilst traveling to
the location of the activity. As for step 2, this risk is influenced
by the length of the journey and the number of stops made,
particularly on premises where susceptible livestock are kept,
or are close by. The likelihood of coming into contact with
susceptible livestock is influenced by the density and proximity
of livestock in the area.
Whilst a contaminated person, animal or vehicle could lead
to further contamination, the virus load by this stage would be
very low.
Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons,
animals, vehicles, or other equipment become contaminated
via environment or contact with infected livestock
during activity
People, vehicles, equipment, or non-susceptible species such
as dogs or horses may come into contact with contaminated
areas or infected livestock during the activity. Areas may
become contaminated from current or previous presence of
infected livestock or livestock products, from infected wildlife,
or through movement of contamination on fomites. FMDV-
infected livestock may be detected (in which case by the premises
is bound by statutory regulations and entry is not permitted)
or undetected. Contamination of areas used for recreational
activities by infected livestock, or risk of contact with infected
livestock, is therefore likely to be due to undetected infection.
This is most likely to happen close to infected premises, or at the
start of an outbreak when the risk of widely dispersed undetected
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premises is higher due to animal movements (see step 1 for
detailed consideration of premises with undetected infection).
The likelihood that the presence of infected animals on the
premises leads to contamination of areas where activities might
take place, depends on how recently the infected animals were
present, number of infected animals, species, virus excretion,
environment conditions (which influence FMDV survival), and
management and grazing patterns (which vary by season).
Contamination could also be introduced viamuck spreading with
contaminated feces or other by-products.
In other parts of the world, wildlife can play an important
role in FMD transmission (40). All British deer species are
susceptible to infection and can transmit virus to domestic
livestock experimentally (41). Wild boar are susceptible and can
transmit infection to domestic pigs, although boar show only
mild clinical signs (42). Sero-surveys and diagnostic testing of
deer and wild boar did not reveal any positive animals in UK,
Netherlands or Germany following the outbreaks in 2001 in
livestock (43, 44). However, seropositive roe deer and wild boar
were found following livestock outbreaks in Thrace (45, 46). In
Europe, models usually conclude that deer and boar populations
cannotmaintain infection in the absence of outbreaks in livestock
(45, 47). Although there is no evidence that deer or boar have
played a role in FMD transmission in UK, their involvement in
facilitating local disease spread does remain a risk.
Other species such as hedgehogs and rodents can be infected
with FMDV, but are unlikely to be very important in transmission
(48, 49). Wildlife can also move FMDV mechanically if they
become contaminated, for example scavengers such as seagulls,
crows and foxes (33, 34, 50). Overall, the risks of further spread
of FMDV associated with wildlife are very low but any activity
which causes disturbance to wildlife does increase this risk,
especially close to premises where FMD is present.
Risk of contamination from infection sources: Persons,
animals, vehicles, or other equipment contaminate
environment or new areas and/or come into contact with
susceptible livestock during activity
Contaminated people, vehicles or equipment, or non-susceptible
species such as horses or dogs, may introduce contamination to
the area. The potential area that could be contaminated is related
to the type of activity. The likelihood also varies with the number
of people, vehicles, equipment, and non-susceptible species
involved, the number that are contaminated and the degree of
contamination. Dogs or horses may spread contamination over
larger areas than, for example, walkers alone. The proximity,
density, and the management type of any susceptible livestock
influences the likelihood of contact, for example for penned dairy
cows would be feasible to prevent contact with people and dogs
but this could be difficult for extensive sheep production.
If people, vehicles, equipment, or non-susceptible species such
as dogs or horses become contaminated during the activity they
may move contamination into new areas. This is particularly
important for activities that involve more than one premises,
for example drag hunting that may cover land associated with
multiple premises. The risks are influenced by the distance
traveled or area covered, number of premises involved, and
the number of people, vehicles, equipment, and non-susceptible
species involved.
Any potential contact between contaminated people, vehicles
or other equipment, or non-susceptible species such as horses or
dogs, and susceptible livestock presents a risk of transmission.
The greatest risks are associated with the presence of susceptible
livestock in the area where the activity is taking place. The
likelihood of contaminated people, vehicles or other equipment
coming into contact with susceptible livestock during the activity
also depends on the type of activity being conducted, the area or
distance covered during the activity, and the type of land used
for the activity. If the activity is taking place in areas which are
not agricultural land and are never used for grazing susceptible
livestock or growing feed or bedding for susceptible livestock,
the risks are negligible. Activities that involve greater numbers
of people increase the risk that some will be contaminated. If
the number of contaminated personnel and vehicles is greater,
the total probable amount of FMDV that would be released
would increase.
Dogs, if present for example for walking, or for deer stalking
or shooting birds, may cover larger distances and be more likely
to come into contact with susceptible livestock. In addition,
the presence of dogs can encourage cattle to approach and
may increase the risk of transmission, if dogs or people are
contaminated. It is possible that contaminated people, vehicles,
equipment, or dogs could come into contact with susceptible
wildlife. Whilst any contact between people and deer is only
likely to occur with deer that have been shot, and are therefore
being removed, susceptible species such as deer could come into
contact with contaminated vehicles. Dogs (particularly if not
restrained) or horses may also disturb wildlife, increasing the
risk of virus dissemination by infected wildlife, as is also the case
for any events that could lead to movement of wildlife such as
deer stalking.
Exposure Assessment
Exposure and infection: Susceptible livestock come into
contact with contaminated area, persons, animals, or vehicles
Susceptible livestock could come into contact with
contamination left on the route, during the activity or if
contaminated people return to their home premises where
livestock are kept. There are also risks for livestock which are
later moved onto to an area where contamination has been
introduced due to survival of FMDV in the environment. FMDV
can survive on soil for 2–5 days at temperatures above 16◦C,
up to 5 weeks at 3–7.5◦C, and over 20 weeks under snow or at
temperatures below 5◦C [reviewed by (1, 2)]. Survival duration
increases with decreasing temperatures, increasing relative
humidity and presence of organic material and varies with virus
strain [reviewed by (1)]. There are therefore risks to livestock
that come into contact with an area where contamination has
been introduced, even after some time as passed, in the right
conditions. The likelihood of this happening is influenced by the
presence, proximity and density of susceptible livestock in the
contaminated area, and degree of contamination.
If roads are contaminated, susceptible livestock could come
into contact with FMDV, if (i) livestock are moved on public
roads; (ii) livestock adjacent to public roads are exposed; or (iii)
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contamination is moved, for example on other vehicles, into
premises where susceptible livestock are kept. In the PZ, SZ, and
RZ, movements of livestock on public roads are not permitted
except under license for specific activities, for example movement
of dairy animals for milking.
Exposure and infection: Susceptible livestock exposed to
contamination become infected
If susceptible livestock are exposed to FMDV they may become
infected. The likelihood that exposure of susceptible livestock
to FMDV in the environment results in infection is not well-
characterized (51), but is likely to vary by species, the virus
dose exposed to and transmission route. When considering the
infection of susceptible livestock via contaminated environment,
the transmission route could be aerosol or oral. Cattle and sheep
are relatively susceptible to aerosol infection, whilst pigs are
not (52–54). Pigs are more susceptible than ruminants by the
oral route, although higher doses are generally require for oral
infection than aerosol infection [reviewed by (13)]. In general
transmissibility is moderate when animals are kept in close
contact; not all exposed animals become infected, and some
only sub-clinically (13, 55). The variability observed through
experimental infections suggests transmission would be much
less efficient when animals are outdoors and in less close contact
(56, 57).
The likelihood of infection is proportional to the virus dose
(53). Indirect transmission is likely to involve lower virus doses
than direct transmission and therefore is less likely to result in
infection. The likelihood of infection occurring following fomite
to fomite transmission can therefore be assumed to be very low.
Consequence Assessment
The end point of the risk pathway for all activities was
the presence of infected livestock on a previously uninfected
premises. The consequences of this include the health and
economic impacts both for the individual farm infected, and for
the wider livestock industry and economy, of prolonging an FMD
outbreak. Since the consequences for each risk pathway were the
same, only the likelihood levels are presented here.
Final likelihood levels for each activity in the PZ, SZ and RZ
are presented in Table 3.
DISCUSSION
The movement of people (and other non-susceptible animals)
to, from and during activities in the countryside during an
FMD outbreak carries a risk of indirect spread of FMDV to
uninfected farms. Indirect transmission of FMDV via fomites
is an important potential source of infection, and any vehicles,
people, non-susceptible animals or equipment that come into
contact with FMDV present a risk of passing disease to any
livestock with which they subsequently come into contact. This
study assessed the risks associated with access to the countryside
during an FMD outbreak to allow increased transparency in
future decision-making.
For most activities, the likelihood of causing new outbreaks of
FMDwas assessed to be very low in the RZ, assuming compliance
TABLE 3 | Likelihood levels of the activities assessed in the protection zone,
surveillance zone, and restricted zone.
Activity Protection
zone
Surveillance
zone
Restricted
zone
Walking Mediuma Medium Low
Medium Low Very low
Cycling Medium Medium Low
Medium Low Very low
Canoeing Medium Medium Low
Medium Low Very low
Fishing Medium Medium Low
Medium Low Very low
Horse riding Medium Medium Low
Medium Low/medium Very low
Staging an equestrian
event on agricultural land
Medium/high Medium Low/medium
Medium Low/medium Low
Staging a race meet Medium/high Medium Low
Medium Low/medium Low
Staging other events on
agricultural land
Medium Medium Low
Medium Low Very low
Organized sporting events Medium Medium Low
Medium Low/medium Low
Drag hunting Not permitted Medium Low
Not permitted Medium Very low
Stalking/shooting deer Not permitted Medium Low/medium
Not permitted Medium Low
Shooting birds Medium Medium Low
Medium Low Very low
aLikelihood levels are shown without any mitigation strategies in place (not italics), and
assuming mitigation strategies are in place and complied with (italics).
with specified mitigation strategies. Risk increases in the SZ and
is greatest in the PZ, closest to identified infected premises.
This is predominantly due to the risks associated with local
spread leading to contamination or the roads and environment
close to known infected premises, and the increased risk of
undetected infected premises. In the early stages of an outbreak,
the likelihood of undetected infected premises is greatest and the
geographical extent of the outbreak is most uncertain, hence a
more conservative assessment of risk is appropriate during this
period. Across all zones, activities which increase the risk level are
those that involve large groups of people, vehicles, movement of
non-susceptible animals such as dogs and horses, and activities
involving susceptible wildlife species. Although horses are not
susceptible to FMD, a sizeable proportion of horse stables are
closely associated with other livestock enterprises in various ways
(e.g., sheep grazing on nearby premises). Therefore, horses (and
associated people, vehicles, and equipment) are considered a
more likely vehicle for FMDV in the face of an outbreak than
other non-susceptible animals or people from the general public.
An additional factor in Scotland is that countryside access is
not limited to paths or specific areas (21), and there are likely
to be more opportunities for people to come into contact with
livestock, wildlife and contaminated areas.
The conclusion of the VRAs was that for most activities, the
likelihood of causing new outbreaks of FMD is considered to be
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 381
Auty et al. Rural Access During FMD Outbreaks
medium (occurs regularly) in the PZ, low (rare but could occur)
in the SZ, and very low (very rare but cannot be excluded) in
the RZ, assuming compliance with specified mitigation strategies
(Table 2). However, the likelihood of new outbreaks associated
with hunting, shooting, stalking, and equestrian activities is
considered to be greater.
The most important source of uncertainty within the VRAs is
attributable to a paucity of data on the likelihood of transmission
via fomites. The lack of data is perhaps surprising given the
priority given to FMD research since 2001. However, meaningful
field data on fomite transmission would be virtually impossible
to collect during an outbreak and experimental studies are
expensive to conduct and could only ever partially address
this question.
There are three main options for management of the risks
associated with countryside access: (i) do not permit access to
the countryside; (ii) do not permit activities when or where the
risk of FMDV being present is greatest (i.e., in a PZ or SZ,
in early stages of an outbreak, or over agricultural land where
susceptible livestock are present); (iii) permit activities from the
early stages of an outbreak but under certain conditions. This
study highlights that there is no justification for automatically
preventing access to the countryside at a Scottish level. Real risks
remain, particularly close to premises with FMD, but for most
activities, the risk is very low at greater distances from premises
with FMD, particularly once the early stage of an outbreak have
passed and the likelihood of undetected infection has reduced.
Therefore, options (ii) or (iii) are appropriate, depending on the
activity. Specific mitigation measures are listed in the individual
VRA documents.
Much of the information available to inform this analysis is
based on FMDV serotype O. This serotype has been responsible
for most of the large outbreaks that have occurred in countries
that are usually FMD-free in the last few decades, and many of
the reported experimental studies on transmission and survival
of FMDV use serotype O [for example (24, 25, 29, 35)]. However,
incursions of other serotypes could occur. Species susceptibility,
length of incubation period, ease of detecting clinical signs and
transmission are known to vary between serotypes and strains.
For example, pigs infected with serotype C produced more
aerosol virus that those infected with serotype O (17), while
pigs infected with serotype A shed more virus than pigs infected
with O or Asia (18). Whilst there is no clear evidence that virus
survival in the environment, likelihood of infection via fomites,
or susceptibility of wildlife species differ between serotypes, these
aspects have not been widely studied and there is not sufficient
information available to have confidence that differences do not
exist. Any differences to these parameters could affect the risk
levels described.
Although this risk assessment focused on Scotland, the
risk pathways described here are likely to be appropriate for
other countries that are usually FMD free without vaccination.
However, the factors that influence the risk level at each step
of the pathway may vary between countries, depending on
factors such as the likelihood of undetected infected premises,
the likelihood of coming into contact with livestock on the way
to/from or whilst conducting the activity (which could depend
on the specific nature of outdoor activities and the ways that
susceptible livestock are kept) and the likelihood that susceptible
wildlife are present. These risk factors and the subsequent
likelihood levels should be reviewed if the risk assessments are
to be used elsewhere.
A risk assessment approach to this issue was appropriate
because it allowed the available evidence to be compiled and
assessed, whilst still provided documents that can be used by
policy-makers for decision making. A qualitative approach was
taken in this study because there were insufficient data to support
a quantitative approach. A risk matrix approach, widely used
including in veterinary science (58) was considered. However,
risk matrices can give a false impression of scientific robustness,
whilst actually relying on subjective risk level estimates which
may be influenced by a range of other considerations such as
personal knowledge and beliefs (59, 60). Examples of uses within
the field of veterinary medicine have also highlighted the issues
of the inability to account for marked variation in estimates
within categories, and loss of information with successive levels
of coding, particularly when the model does not take a modular
step-wise form (61). Therefore, we used a qualitative descriptive
approach that would allow us to conclude an overall risk level
and highlight areas of particular uncertainty and variability. It is
acknowledged that formally soliciting expert opinion (62) may
have reduced uncertainty in some parameters. However, the
policy imperative did not allow time for this and the subsequent
rounds of peer-review process reassured us that our original risk
estimates would not be substantially altered.
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